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Essay
Griswold ’s Criminal Law
MELISSA MURRAY
This Symposium commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v.
Connecticut. In the fifty years since it was announced, Griswold’s logic has
underwritten a broader commitment to reproductive rights—one that has
expanded the right to contraception and secured a woman’s right to
choose an abortion. Amidst these developments it is easy to overlook
another aspect of Griswold’s history. Griswold also was part of a criminal
law reform effort that sought to reimagine the state’s authority in the
intimate lives of citizens and limit the use of criminal law as a means of
enforcing moral conformity. In this regard, Griswold shares roots with the
Model Penal Code, the Wolfenden Report, and the Hart-Devlin Debates—
all of which arose in a social and legal milieu in which the question of
whether the state could—or should—police intimate conduct through the
criminal law was a subject of considerable debate. In overlooking this
aspect of Griswold, we have obscured its historical context and, perhaps
more troublingly, limited its impact in defining the extent of the state’s
power to regulate sex and sexuality. This brief Essay recovers this
overlooked aspect of Griswold’s history. In so doing, it situates Griswold
in this historical debate about the scope and limits of the state’s authority
to police intimate life through the criminal law. As importantly, it
considers the implications of this history for our contemporary efforts to
expand sexual liberty.
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GRISWOLD’S CRIMINAL LAW
MELISSA MURRAY
I. INTRODUCTION
This Symposium commemorates the fiftieth anniversary of Griswold v.
Connecticut,1 the United States Supreme Court decision that famously
articulated a right to privacy.2 In the fifty years since it was announced,
Griswold’s logic has underwritten a broader commitment to reproductive
rights—one that has expanded the right to contraception3 and secured a
woman’s right to choose an abortion.4 Amidst all of these developments it
is easy to overlook another aspect of Griswold’s history. Although
Griswold was part of a larger campaign to expand access to birth control,5
it was also part of another historical moment, one that sought to reimagine
the state’s authority in the intimate lives of citizens and limit the use of
criminal law as a means of enforcing moral conformity. In this regard,
Griswold arose in a social and legal milieu in which the question of
whether the state could—or should—police intimate conduct through the
criminal law was a subject of considerable debate.
Few have explored the criminal law aspect of Griswold. This oversight
is unfortunate. In overlooking this part of Griswold, we have obscured its
historical context and, perhaps more troublingly, limited its impact in
defining the extent of the state’s power to regulate sex and sexuality. This
brief Essay recovers this overlooked aspect of Griswold’s history. In so
doing, it situates Griswold in this historical debate about the scope and
limits of the state’s authority to police intimate life through the criminal

Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. K.T. Albiston, Bennett Capers, Doug
NeJaime, Alice Ristroph, Reva Siegel, Karen Tani, and Rose Cuison Villazor provided very helpful
comments and feedback. Michael Levy of the Berkeley Law Library went above and beyond in
providing necessary guidance and assistance. Finally, I am grateful to Sheila Menz, Maya Khan, and
Lydia Anderson-Dana for superlative research assistance.
1
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2
Id. at 486 (“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our
political parties, older than our school system.”).
3
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If under Griswold the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons
would be equally impermissible.”).
4
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision . . . .”).
5
See generally DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1998) (offering a detailed account of the campaign against prohibitions on
contraception).
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law. As importantly, it considers the implications of this history for our
contemporary efforts to expand sexual liberty.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part II begins in the 1940s and
1950s and documents the debate over the state’s use of the criminal law to
police morality and the resulting effort to liberalize the criminal laws that
regulated various aspects of intimate life. Part III then shifts to the 1960s to
recover connections between Griswold and this criminal law reform effort.
As it explains, although we regard Griswold as part of the Sexual
Revolution and the liberalization of norms regarding sex and sexuality, the
case was also part of a related effort to modernize and reform the criminal
law and limit the state’s ability to regulate intimate life. Part IV considers
why this aspect of Griswold has been overlooked. It suggests that
Griswold’s emphasis on privacy—and specifically, the privacy rights of
married couples—had the effect of subordinating the broader debate about
the use of criminal law to police and enforce majoritarian moral values
about sex and sexuality. Indeed, it would be almost forty years before the
principles and values that animated the criminal law reform effort would
be fully reflected in the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence. In the
2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,6 a majority of the Court not only elaborated
Griswold’s understanding of privacy to include the unmarried, it squarely
confronted the debate over the state’s use of criminal law to police and
enforce moral conformity.7
Part IV also considers the implications of this reclaimed history. As it
explains, recovering Griswold’s criminal law antecedents not only
provides a more complete historical narrative for locating the case and
assessing its legacy, it also underscores the continued relevancy of the
normative question at the heart of the criminal law reform debate and
Griswold: Should the state use its authority to enforce moral conformity
among its citizens? Although Lawrence built upon Griswold to limit the
state’s ability to use the criminal law to regulate sexual morality, the state
continues to rely on civil means to accomplish many of these ends. The
civil regulation of sex and sexuality, however, has gone largely unnoticed.
In this regard, the broader debate over state authority to regulate sex and
sexuality, of which Griswold was a crucial part, persists in contemporary
legal culture. Recovering Griswold’s place in the debate over the state’s
regulation of sexual morality provides an important opportunity to consider
how and why state regulation of sex and sexuality has persisted in the face
of constitutional protections for privacy in intimate life.

6
7

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 571, 578–79.
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II. BEFORE GRISWOLD:
MORALS LEGISLATION AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM
Since the founding, American jurisdictions relied on the criminal law
to regulate sex and sexuality.8 In many states, sex outside of marriage was
punished under laws prohibiting fornication or adultery.9 Sodomy—the
infamous “crime against nature”—was subject to a prison term.10 Even
efforts to control reproduction through contraception or abortion were
routinely criminalized in order to deter promiscuity and channel sex into
marriage.11
The state’s ability to regulate intimate life in this manner was widely
acknowledged to be within the scope of its police power to promote the
health, safety, and general welfare of its citizens.12 But by the 1940s and
1950s, this traditional authority was being called into question. In two
ground-breaking sex studies, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male13 and
Sexual Behavior in the Human Female,14 Indiana University’s Alfred
Kinsey drew back the curtain on the intimate lives of everyday Americans.
According to Kinsey, Americans routinely engaged in sexual acts and
practices that violated the criminal laws of most jurisdictions.15 The
8

See JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY
15–32 (1988) (describing such “morals offenses”); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127–32 (1993) (detailing moral crimes).
9
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 128–31 (discussing punishment of fornication and adultery);
BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN
REFORM TRADITION 31–33 (1987) (describing various punishments for fornication and adultery).
10
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1986) (discussing the history of anti-sodomy
laws in the United States); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY
LAWS IN AMERICA 1861–2003 17, 19–20, 53–54 (2008) (describing the history of anti-sodomy laws in
the U.S.).
11
See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 159–78 (1985) (discussing the criminalization of abortion and contraception);
Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of
Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1271–72 (2009) (discussing the ways in which criminal law
historically has been used to enforce intimate norms); see generally LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN
ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 (1997)
(discussing the criminalization of abortion).
12
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 596 (1868) (arguing that the
protection of public morals was a legitimate use of the state’s police power); ERNST FREUND, THE
POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 9 (1904) (contending that the
“cultivation of moral, intellectual and aesthetic forces and interests which advance civilisation and
benefit the community . . . cannot be a matter of indifference to the state.”).
13
ALFRED. C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
14
ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
15
ESKRIDGE JR., supra, note 10, at 109 (discussing Kinsey’s presentation of a discussion paper
entitled “Biological Aspects of Some Social Problems,” which argued that the law was divorced from
the reality of intimate life and calling for law reform); see also Michael Kirby, Sexuality and Global
Forces: Dr. Alfred Kinsey and the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
IN AMERICA
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problem was not the acts themselves, which, in Kinsey’s view, were
commonplace and therefore “normal,” but rather a religiously-inflected
legal regime that criminalized these acts in the name of preserving
morality.16
But it was not just that Kinsey revealed the “incredibly wide gap
between the law’s expectations and the people’s actual practices as to
sexual conduct;”17 it was that the existence of the laws on the books
seemed at odds with law enforcement priorities. In most cases, moral
offenses went unenforced. If they were enforced, it was done selectively,
often targeting vulnerable populations.18 In this regard, the laws’ existence,
coupled with their frequent violation and uneven enforcement, “instilled
cynicism toward the law,” diminishing respect for the legal system.19 Not
content simply to note the disjunction between law’s expectations and the
reality of quotidian life, Kinsey began advocating for legal reform.20
Private, consensual sexual acts, Kinsey argued, should be beyond the
purview of the criminal law.21
Critically, Kinsey’s was not the only voice calling for criminal law
reform. In 1954, in the United Kingdom, Parliament convened the
Wolfenden Committee in the wake of a series of controversial prosecutions
of prominent Londoners on charges of homosexual sodomy.22 Tasked with
considering the ongoing efficacy of laws criminalizing homosexual
sodomy and prostitution, the Wolfenden Committee issued a report to the
British Parliament recommending the decriminalization of consensual
same-sex sodomy.23 In calling for these reforms, the Wolfenden Report
emphasized limits on the state’s authority to criminalize private,
consensual conduct, noting that “there must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law’s
business.”24
The Wolfenden Report prompted a series of debates between the legal
STUD. 485, 493 (2007) (noting that the Kinsey Reports “challenged assumptions that were generally
accepted throughout the world concerning human sexual experience” ) (footnotes omitted).
16
Id.
17
GERHARD O.W. MUELLER, LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUAL CONDUCT 17 (1961).
18
Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offense and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671
(1963) (“[O]ne can examine side effects of the effort to enforce morality by penal law. . . . Are police
forces, prosecution resources, and court time being wastefully diverted from the central insecurities of
our metropolitan life—robbery, burglary, rape, assault, and governmental corruption?”).
19
LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 106 (2013).
20
Id. at 105.
21
Id.
22
See JOHN FREDERICK WOLFENDEN, TURNING POINTS: THE MEMOIRS OF LORD WOLFENDEN
129–46 (1976) (discussing the origins of the Wolfenden Committee).
23
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION ¶ 62, at 48 (Authorized American ed., Stein & Day 1963).
24
Id. at ¶ 61, at 48.
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philosopher H.L.A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin, a prominent
conservative on Britain’s High Court, on the role that majoritarian social
mores should play in the criminal law.25 Devlin argued that irrespective of
harm or injury to persons or property, the criminal law legitimately could
be used to discourage deviations from commonly-held notions of
morality.26 In response, Hart argued that although the criminal law could
be used to address immoral acts that posed harm to third parties or property
(like murder or theft), it should not be used to criminalize all departures
from majoritarian mores, including departures from commonly-held mores
regarding out-of-wedlock sex.27
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American Law Institute (ALI), a
group of prominent lawyers, judges, and legal scholars charged with
clarifying and simplifying the American common law, was also launching
its own effort to reform and modernize American criminal law.28 Led by
Columbia Law School professor Herbert Wechsler, the ALI’s Model Penal
Code (MPC) project sought to draft a modern criminal code that could be
adopted in whole or in part by individual states.29 Although the MPC’s
drafters would consider a wide range of reforms, they took particular
interest in the reform of the laws governing sexual offenses. In this aspect
of the reform project, the drafters were influenced by Kinsey’s research30
and the Wolfenden Report.31 Like the Wolfenden Committee, the MPC
drafters worried that laws criminalizing private sexual conduct between
consenting adults intruded too far into private life.32 As importantly, the
drafters were sensitive to concerns that enforcing victimless sex offenses
diverted scarce public resources from more pressing criminal justice issues,
25
See Mary Ann Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75,
123–24 (noting that the Hart-Devlin debates were a response to the Wolfenden Report); David Alan
Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal
Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 914 (2008) (noting that “[t]he Hart-Devlin debate . . . was an
outgrowth” of the Wolfenden Committee Report).
26
See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 2–3 (1965) (discussing the role that
criminal law should play in safeguarding society).
27
See H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 57 (1963) (arguing that “where there is no
harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be protected”—as is the case with “conventional sexual
morality”—there is little value in pursuing legal punishment).
28
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 121.
29
Id.
30
WHEELER, supra note 19, at 105. Not coincidentally the ALI and Kinsey shared a prominent
funder—the Rockefeller Foundation. Id. at 107. Kinsey himself became a forceful advocate for
criminal law reform. In 1949, he attended an all-day forum for the Study and Prevention of Crime
convened at Columbia University, where he advocated for changes to the laws governing sexual
offenses. Penal Codes Seen in Need of Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1949, at 59. As he explained,
“[n]ot more than 5 per cent of persons who pass through the courts are involved in sexual behavior
which damages other individuals.” Id. The other 95 per cent “are involved in sexual behavior that
transgresses laws that have no function other than to preserve custom.” Id.
31
WHEELER, supra note 19, at 110–12.
32
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 121–22.
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33

like rising rates of violent crime.
At the ALI’s annual meeting in 1962, a draft of the MPC was
presented to the membership for approval.34 The draft’s provisions relating
to sexual offenses reflected the sentiments of a prominent member of the
MPC’s advisory committee, the late Judge Learned Hand. In 1955, at the
inauguration of the MPC project, Judge Hand made clear his views of the
state’s use of criminal law as a vehicle for enforcing morality.35 As he
explained, “I think [the criminal regulation of sex] is a matter of morals, a
matter largely of taste, and it is not a matter that people should be put in
prison about.”36 The final draft of the MPC concurred, urging substantial
changes in the laws governing adultery, fornication, prostitution, abortion,
contraception, and private acts of sodomy between consenting adults.37
Under the MPC, fornication and adultery were no longer criminalized.38
State regulation of abortion was liberalized to permit “therapeutic”
abortions in cases of rape, incest, and harm—broadly conceived—to the
mother.39 Criminalization of sodomy was reserved for circumstances
involving force and/or public conduct.40
The draft was eventually approved by a vote of the ALI’s
membership.41 And, as the MPC drafters hoped, the ALI’s effort to reform
sexual offenses spawned similar legislative reform efforts in other
jurisdictions, including Illinois and New York.42
In seeking legislative reform of extant criminal laws regulating sex and
sexuality, the MPC, the Wolfenden Report, and many of the state
legislative reform efforts emphasized a sphere of private, intimate life
secluded from the state and insulated from criminal regulation.43 By the
1950s and 1960s, the concept of a zone of privacy beyond the state’s
regulatory ambit began to coalesce in two Supreme Court decisions
concerning the scope of constitutional protections for criminal defendants.
In Rochin v. California,44 the Supreme Court reversed a criminal
33
See id. at 122 (“[S]carce enforcement resources are better deployed against activities that cause
serious harm.”); Schwartz, supra note 18, at 671 (arguing that one side effect of the effort to enforce
morality by penal law is that “police forces, prosecution resources, and court time” are wastefully
diverted from more “central” concerns, such as “robbery, burglary, rape, assault, and government
corruption”).
34
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 124.
35
Anthony Lewis, Morals Issue: Crime or Not?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1964, at E10.
36
Id.
37
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 123–24.
38
Id.
39
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (1962).
40
ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 10, at 124.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 137 (noting the “liberal discourse of privacy that undergirded the Model Penal Code and
the Wolfenden Report . . . .” (italics omitted)).
44
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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conviction that was based upon evidence obtained when police officers
forcibly entered the bedroom of a suspect and his wife.45 According to the
Court, the officers’ efforts to obtain evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
which included “[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner,”
forcibly opening his mouth to remove recently-swallowed materials, and
ordering the “forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents,” “shock[ed] the
conscience.”46 Evidence obtained through such “brutal conduct” was akin
to a coerced confession, and as such, violated the Due Process Clause.47
Nearly a decade later, Mapp v. Ohio48 offered the Court an opportunity
to elaborate the contours of these constitutional protections. Like Rochin,
Mapp involved an intrusive search of an individual’s home. Brandishing a
fabricated warrant, Cleveland police officers initiated a thorough search of
Dollree Mapp’s home, including her bedroom, her “child’s bedroom, the
living room, the kitchen and a dinette.”49 They ultimately discovered a
cache of pornographic material in a trunk in the basement.50 Although she
disclaimed ownership of the trunk and its contents,51 Mapp was arrested,
prosecuted, and found guilty of “knowingly having had in her possession
and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and
photographs” in violation of state law.52
Despite the fact that it was nominally an obscenity case,53 Mapp’s
lawyers emphasized the state’s intrusion into the private sphere.54 In
overturning Mapp’s conviction, the Court seemed to agree that the police
search had gone too far.55 Referencing Rochin, the Mapp Court articulated
a “freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy” rooted in the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments.56
45

Id. at 165.
Id. at 172.
47
Id. at 173.
48
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49
Id. at 645.
50
Id. at 645; see Transcript of Record at 22, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236)
(containing Officer Delau’s testimony that his partner, Officer Dever, found a “foot locker” in the
basement containing “policy paraphernalia”).
51
Brief of Appellant on the Merits at 6, State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960) (No. 236)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
52
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
53
See Brief of Appellant on the Merits at 1, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236) (“The
Appellant was convicted of the crime that she ‘unlawfully and knowingly had in her possession and
under her control, certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures and photographs, being so indecent and
immoral in their nature that the same would be offensive to the Court and improper to be placed on the
records thereof’ . . . in violation of Sec. 2905.34, Ohio Revised Code.”).
54
See id. at 18 (arguing that the officer’s conduct “portray[ed] a shocking disregard of human
rights” and referencing the Rochin Court’s observations that “[i]llegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner . . . offends even hardened sensibilities” and “shock[s] the conscience”).
55
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
56
Id. at 657.
46
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Although Rochin and Mapp were principally concerned with
procedural protections for criminal defendants, criminal law reformers57
interested in substantive limits on the state’s use of the criminal law saw
great promise in the Court’s assertion that “the security of one’s privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”58 And indeed, they built upon the logic of these criminal
procedure cases in their efforts to challenge morals legislation in the
courts.
III. SEX, CRIME, AND BIRTH CONTROL:
LITIGATING A RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT
As Part II detailed, the 1940s and 1950s witnessed the emergence of a
robust debate about whether and how to draw limits on the state’s authority
to criminalize private consensual sex between adults. This Part explores
the connections between this criminal reform debate and the battle over
access to contraception that led to 1965’s Griswold v. Connecticut. As it
explains, in the period preceding Griswold, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and birth control activists came together to harness the
logic of the criminal reform effort—and the underlying interest in privacy
as a bulwark against the state—in challenging prohibitions on
contraception. In doing so, these groups crafted a more expansive vision of
civil liberties—one that went beyond the traditional understanding of
protections for First Amendment rights to encompass protections against
state regulation of sexual morality, including bans on contraception. In this
regard, Griswold, and the ongoing effort to invalidate Connecticut’s ban on
contraception, was not simply about reproductive freedom and marital
privacy; it was also about the larger question of constitutional protection
against state encroachment into intimate life.
The ACLU’s interest in privacy as a means of protecting civil liberties
was evident in their litigation efforts in Rochin and Mapp.59 Critically, the
ACLU’s emphasis on a right to privacy in these cases reflected a shift in
the organization’s understanding of civil liberties. For much of its history,
the ACLU had focused on bringing First Amendment challenges to
censorship laws and laws prohibiting speech and the dissemination of
57
See infra Part III (discussing the ways in which reformers leveraged these decisions to
challenge prohibitions on contraception).
58
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
59
See Brief of Am. Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 1, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (No. 83) (“We believe that California denied petitioner the minimum of respect for the
dignity and privacy of the individual required by the democratic concept of the individual’s status in
the State, and that his conviction was a violation of the due process of law guaranteed by the
Constitution.”); Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Am. Civil Liberties Union and Ohio Civil Liberties
Union at 11–16, State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960) (No. 236) (arguing that the Ohio
obscenity statute violated the constitutional right to privacy).
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60

knowledge. Rochin and Mapp, however, reflected a more expansive view
of civil liberties—one that went beyond the First Amendment and the
dissemination of ideas to include limits on other exercises of state
authority.
The ACLU’s emphasis on privacy and limits on state authority was
deeply informed by the “penal law reform movement that aimed to
decriminalize sexual activities between consenting adults.”61 ACLU
lawyers were aware of, and indeed, at times contributed to the ALI’s
Model Penal Code project and its reform of sexual offenses.62 Sexologist
Alfred Kinsey, who had been an early voice in the effort to liberalize the
criminal regulation of private consensual sex, also served as a conduit for
the exchange of ideas between the ACLU and the criminal law reform
movement.63 Kinsey’s research routinely drew the attention of government
officials. Accordingly, in a number of legal matters, including a federal
obscenity challenge in United States v. 31 Photographs,64 ACLU lawyers
Harriet Pilpel and Morris Ernst represented Kinsey against the
government.65 Pilpel and Ernst came to agree with Kinsey that the
criminalization of private, consensual sexual conduct allowed the state too
much authority over intimate life, and in so doing, imposed severe
constraints on individual rights and liberties.66
The ACLU was not the only organization to view the criminal
regulation of sex as an imposition on individual rights and liberties—or to
borrow from the criminal law reform movement in challenging these laws.
The birth control movement also began to perceive its mission to legalize
contraception as part of a larger effort to preserve the exercise of individual
rights and liberties against the state’s use of the criminal law. In a 1955
advertisement, the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut (PPLC)
expressed this sentiment in graphic detail. Calling attention to the state’s
use of the criminal law to police contraceptive use, the advertisement
warned, “[a] policeman in every home is the only way to enforce this
law.”67 To visually impart the law’s intrusion into the lives of citizens, the
60
See WHEELER, supra note 19, at 93 (“By the 1940s, the ACLU had made a name for itself
defending the First Amendment rights of birth control activists, authors, nudists, playwrights, and even
consumers. With the exception of nudists, however—which remained a special but still peripheral issue
for the ACLU—sexual conduct seemed another matter entirely.”).
61
See id. at 103–04.
62
See id. at 104–08 (discussing the cross-fertilization of ideas between the ACLU and the ALI).
63
See id. at 105–07 (discussing Kinsey’s interactions with ACLU lawyers).
64
156 F. Supp. 350, 352–53, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (holding that articles deemed obscene for use
by the general public may be exempt from obscenity laws when used solely for bona fide scientific
research). For a discussion of the case, see Kenneth R. Stevens, United States v. 31 Photographs: Dr.
Alfred C. Kinsey and Obscenity Law, 71 IND. MAG. HIST. 299 (1975).
65
See WHEELER, supra note 19, at 105.
66
See id. at 105–07.
67
Id. at 97–98 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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advertisement depicted police officers hiding under beds, eager to
document conjugal activities.68 The advertisement was a chilling reminder
to affluent women—who could obtain birth control easily from their
physicians rather than relying on birth control clinics like their poorer
sisters69—that Connecticut’s ban on contraceptive use nonetheless
presented a serious imposition on their own rights and liberties.
With their interests more closely aligned, the ACLU joined forces with
the birth control movement to launch a challenge to Connecticut’s ban on
contraceptive use.70 The ban was actually composed of two distinct
criminal statutes. Initially passed in 1879, Section 53-3271 prohibited the
“[u]se of drugs or instruments to prevent conception,” punishing violators
with a fine of “not less than fifty dollars” and/or a term of imprisonment of
“not less than sixty days nor more than one year.”72 Enforcement of the
“use” statute was complemented by Section 54-196,73 Connecticut’s
complicity statute, which provided that “[a]ny person who assists, abets,
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”74 The
case, Poe v. Ullman,75 initially was brought by three Connecticut married
couples and their doctor, C. Lee Buxton.76 According to the plaintiffs, the
Connecticut contraceptive ban violated their due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.77 In making this claim, the appellants elaborated
the privacy arguments glimpsed in Rochin and Mapp, contending that the
Connecticut law posed a significant intrusion into intimate life.78 The
argument sparked by the criminal law reform movement, and tested in the
68

See id. at 98 (providing a graphic of the advertisement).
For a discussion of the socio-economic consequences of the contraception ban, see Cary
Franklin, Griswold and the Public Dimension of the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 332 (2015); see
also Brief for Planned Parenthood as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at *21, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (arguing that the Connecticut contraception ban was
“grossly discriminatory,” because its “real impact is on those most in need of family planning service,
i.e., the indigent and under-educated, whose medical help must come from public clinics”).
70
GARROW, supra note 5, at 147–60 (discussing the circumstances leading to Poe v. Ullman).
71
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958).
72
Id.
73
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (1958).
74
Id.
75
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
76
Id. at 498–500. Critically, the Poe lawyers also filed a companion case, Trubek v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 907 (1961). Like Poe, Trubek was also dismissed without a ruling on the merits. See id. For a
discussion of Trubek, see Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE
L.J. F. 324 (2015).
77
Brief for Appellants at 10, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (No. 60), 1960 WL 98679 at
*10.
78
See id. at *28 (“When the long arm of the law reaches into the bedroom and regulates the most
sacred relations between a man and his wife, it is going too far. There must be a limit to the extent to
which the moral scruples, of a substantial minority or, for that matter, of a majority, can be enacted into
laws which regulate the private sex life of all married people.”).
69
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context of procedural protections for criminal defendants, was now
deployed to challenge a substantive criminal law.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed Poe v. Ullman on jurisdictional
grounds.79 Nevertheless, the privacy argument resonated with Associate
Justices William O. Douglas and John Marshall Harlan. In considering the
Connecticut ban, Douglas imagined a world where “full enforcement of the
law . . . would reach the point where search warrants issued and officers
appeared in bedrooms to find out what went on.”80 Such an invasion of
“the innermost sanctum of the home,” in Douglas’s view, constituted “an
invasion of the privacy that is implicit in a free society.”81
Although Harlan agreed that the Connecticut ban presented an
imposition on privacy rights,82 his dissent also engaged the question of the
state’s authority to legislate morality.83 Critically, Harlan did not dispute
the state’s authority to legislate in order to promote its “people’s moral
welfare,”84 including laws that prohibited “adultery, homosexuality,
fornication and incest.”85 But the Connecticut ban, which “determined that
the use of contraceptives is as iniquitous as any act of extra-marital sexual
immorality” was “surely a very different thing indeed from punishing those
who establish intimacies which the law has always forbidden and which
can have no claim to social protection.”86
In this way, both Douglas and Harlan echoed aspects of the broader
criminal law reform debate that had raged over the last fifteen years.
Should the state use the criminal law to police morality? And if the state
could use the criminal law to police morals, how far could it go to do so?
Did the Constitution impose any restraints on the exercise of state police
power in intimate life? For Harlan, state regulation of sexual morality was

79
367 U.S. at 508 (“The fact that Connecticut has not chosen to press the enforcement of this
statute deprives these controversies of the immediacy which is an indispensable condition of
constitutional adjudication. This Court cannot be umpire to debates concerning harmless, empty
shadows.”).
80
Id. at 519–20 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81
Id. at 521.
82
See id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting “the intrusion of the whole machinery of the
criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy, requiring husband and wife to render account before
a criminal tribunal of their uses of that intimacy . . . .”).
83
See id. at 539 (“In reviewing state legislation, whether considered to be in the exercise of the
State’s police powers, or in provision for the health, safety, morals or welfare of its people, it is clear
that what is concerned are ‘the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.’ Only to the extent
that the Constitution so requires may this Court interfere with the exercise of this plenary power of
government.”) (internal citations omitted).
84
Id. at 553.
85
Id. at 552. Critically, Justice Harlan understood laws prohibiting adultery and homosexuality to
“foster[] and protect[]” marriage by “regulat[ing] by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy.” Id. at 553.
86
Id.
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permissible, but the state’s authority was not unfettered. The state could
not go so far as to intrude upon an institution that the state valued,
protected, and promoted, as it did marriage and the family.88 Although he
did not endorse state regulation of adultery and fornication, Douglas also
appeared convinced that state intervention into the home to police
contraceptive use among married couples violated the Constitution.89
Because it dismissed Poe v. Ullman on jurisdictional grounds,90 the
Court did not have the opportunity to consider these questions against the
backdrop of the federal Constitution. However, soon after the Court’s
decision in Poe, the PPLC opened a birth control clinic in New Haven.91
As expected, the birth control clinic drew law enforcement attention.92
Soon after the clinic’s opening, its Executive Director, Estelle Griswold,
and its physician, C. Lee Buxton, were arrested and charged under Sections
53-32 and 54-196,93 setting the stage for Griswold v. Connecticut.94
Like the plaintiffs in Poe v. Ullman, Griswold and Buxton emphasized
a right to privacy as a limit on the state’s authority.95 Critically, however,
Griswold, Buxton, and their amici proffered other arguments that, like the
privacy argument, were rooted in the larger debate about criminal law
reform and state enforcement of morals.96 In their brief, the appellants,
87
See id. at 552–53 (weighing the state’s interest in regulating morality against the individual’s
right to privacy).
88
See id. at 553 (“[T]he intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted
feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which
always and in every age it has fostered and protected.”).
89
See id. at 519–21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (contending that the contraceptive ban impermissibly
intruded on the privacy of married couples).
90
Id. at 508–09.
91
See Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Connecticut Supreme Court Before
Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 936 (1990) (“The Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut opened a birth control clinic on November 1, 1961, at its Trumbull Street headquarters in
New Haven.”).
92
Id. at 936–37.
93
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958) (repealed 1969) (“Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than
fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned”); see also CONN. GEN. STAT § 54-196 (1958) (repealed 1969) (“Any person who assists,
abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and
punished as if he were the principal offender).
94
Dudziak, supra note 91, at 937.
95
Brief for Appellants at 67, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“[W]e
simply note, as one of the major costs that must be weighed against any possible gain, the unparalleled
invasion of privacy which the law and its enforcement would entail.”).
96
For example, the appellants’ brief in Griswold discussed at great length whether the
Connecticut statutes were an accurate expression of majoritarian sexual values, and if so, whether they
were an appropriate use of the state’s police power. See id. at 35–37, 48–49 (“The objective of the
Connecticut statues—according to the premise we are now indulging—is to promote public morality by
making it a criminal offense to prevent conception by some of the methods set forth above, but not
others. . . . [T]he precise issue is whether the prohibition of those methods selected by the Connecticut
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represented by Yale Law professor Thomas Emerson and Connecticut civil
rights lawyer Catherine Roraback, with assistance from the ACLU and the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA),97 went beyond privacy
to explain that morals legislation, like the Connecticut laws at issue, were
prone to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.98 The concern with
selective and discriminatory enforcement was one that figured prominently
in the ALI’s efforts to reform sexual offenses in the MPC.99 Indeed,
Emerson and Roraback seemed to be parroting the MPC’s concerns about
the abuse of sexual offenses laws when they noted that the challenged
Connecticut statutes could be used “for blackmail, or for paying off a
grudge, or for harassment of an unpopular citizen. It is not capable of
rational administration.”100
In addition to concerns about arbitrary enforcement, Emerson and
Roraback argued that the challenged Connecticut statutes had the perverse
effect of encouraging other criminal behavior. As they explained in their
brief on behalf of Griswold and Buxton, “[t]he statutes tend to produce an
increase in the number of illegal abortions.”101 In its amicus brief, the
PPFA elaborated this concern about cultivating other criminal behavior by
reviving an argument first ventilated in Poe v. Ullman.102 In Poe, the
appellants argued that because Connecticut prohibited married couples
legislature, viewed as a regulation to promote the public morality, conforms to the standard of due
process of law. . . . Certainly the court cannot take the position that the simple claim of a moral aim by
the legislature satisfies the requirements of due process. . . . It would allow the legislature to impose
restraints upon individual liberties solely on the ground that some insignificant fraction of the
community regarded the issue as a moral one. . . . Our concern here is with the current views of the
community as to the moral basis for prohibiting the use of extrinsic aids in avoiding conception. . . . We
submit that the overwhelming opinion of today does not regard the use of extrinsic aids by married
couples in avoiding conception as morally reprehensible, or at least does not regard the use of such aids
by other persons as affording moral grounds for absolute prohibition by government decree.”).
97
Both the ACLU and the PPFA filed amicus briefs in support of Griswold and Buxton. See Brief
for Am. Civil Liberties Union and the Conn. Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 3, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496); Brief and Appendices for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am. as Amici Curiae, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
98
See Brief for Appellants at 70–71, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496)
(“The Connecticut statutes operate in an irrational manner in . . . important respects. . . . The
statutes . . . would always be applicable to married persons and seldom applicable to unmarried persons
engaging in sexual relations. . . . The statutes operate to discriminate against low-income groups. . . .
Since the statutes are not generally enforced or enforceable, they can only be applied to individuals in
an arbitrary fashion.”).
99
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207 comments on sexual offenses, at 12 (Council Draft No. 8, 1955)
(“There is some indication that these laws, like other dead letter statutes, may lend themselves to
discriminatory enforcement . . . .”).
100
Brief for Appellants at 71–72, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
101
Id.
102
See Brief and Appendices for Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. as Amici Curiae at 10,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“The consequences of the human sexual
drive are made clear also in the research findings that there are an estimated 1,000,000 unlawful
abortions in the United States each year . . . and in other social problems too numerous to detail.”).
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from using contraception, abstinence was the only means available to
avoid pregnancy. As an alternative to contraception for married couples,
abstinence, the Poe appellants maintained, was unrealistic and
undesirable.103 Abstinence, they argued, required suppressing a natural
sexual urge that, by law, could only be expressed in marriage: “To
demand prolonged continence as the only method of contraception from
anyone who is not stoutly bulwarked by the strongest spiritual sanction is
to drive that individual to what society has judged criminal.”104
In its amicus brief in Griswold, the PPFA reiterated these connections
between abstinence and criminal sex. In a lengthy appendix, the PPFA
cited numerous scholars, all of whom were skeptical of abstinence as a
plausible alternative to contraception.105 According to one scholar,
abstinence could be successful only “[i]f men were angels.”106 More often,
abstinence resulted in physiological and psychological anxieties that could
render both spouses susceptible “to outside sex temptations.”107 Indeed,
one scholar blamed abstinence for “driving the husband into the arms of
prostitutes,”108 while another scholar mused that the unavailability of
contraception (and the concomitant reliance on abstinence as a method of
family planning) was directly correlated with the increased incidence of
illegal abortions.109
Importantly, all of these arguments had been raised earlier in Poe and
in the criminal law reform debate. As the criminal law reformers
explained, the state could not justify the criminal regulation of sex and
sexuality on the ground that doing so promoted morals and the public
welfare, if in fact such laws actually prompted more offensive conduct.
Likewise, the Poe and Griswold appellants relied on these arguments to
cast doubt on the efficacy of the state’s justifications for the contraceptive
ban. How could this imposition on individual liberty be justified if criminal
bans on contraception actually encouraged more pernicious forms of
sexual immorality that undermined marriage and the marital family?
103
See id. at 13 (“So far as abstinence is concerned, as a limitation of births, it should be enough
to state that it is common knowledge that for all societies in all ages, it has not worked . . . .”); Brief
and Appendices of Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. as Amicus Curiae, at 9–10, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (“[F]or most humans [abstinence] does not work.”).
104
Id. at 30–31 (internal citations omitted).
105
See id. app. at 39b–48b (compiling numerous quotations from medical authorities on the topic
of abstinence as an alternative to contraception).
106
Id. app. at 45b (quoting J. Whitridge Williams, Indications for Therapeutic Sterilization in
Obstetrics, 91 JAMA 1239, 1241 (1928)).
107
Id. app. at 47b (quoting LORD DAWSON, MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CONTRACEPTION 175 (1927)).
108
Id. app. at 44b–45b (quoting WILLIAM J. ROBINSON, FEWER AND BETTER BABIES: BIRTH
CONTROL OR THE LIMITATION OF OFFSPRING BY PREVENCEPTION 36–38 (46th ed. 1931)).
109
See id. at 10 (“The consequences of the human sexual drive are made clear also in the research
findings that there are an estimated 1,000,000 unlawful abortions in the United States each year . . . .”
(citing MARY CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 180 (1958))).
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These arguments, which situated the contraceptive ban within the
broader criminal law reform debate, were aired in the briefs, but they never
eclipsed the privacy argument in the Griswold Court’s decision-making.110
Although the Court invalidated the Connecticut ban, its analysis focused
on a right to privacy that inhered in the marital relationship.111 On this
account, the Connecticut ban was offensive not because it relied on the
criminal law to demand conformity with particular sexual mores, but
because it “operate[d] directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife
and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”112
Still, shades of the broader criminal law reform concerns could be
glimpsed in Griswold. Toward the opinion’s conclusion, Justice Douglas
gestured toward the criminal reform debate, musing “[w]ould we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs
of the use of contraceptives?”113 “The very idea [wa]s repulsive.”114 But
critically, the revulsion that the prospect of jackbooted police officers
hiding under beds produced was not framed as a broad concern about the
prospect of unfettered state authority in the lives of citizens. Instead, any
limits on state power were expressly tethered to “the notions of privacy
surrounding the marital relationship.”115 With marriage and the marital
couple in the foreground, more general concerns about limiting state
authority and reforming the criminal law slipped beneath Griswold’s
surface.
IV. RECOVERING GRISWOLD’S CRIMINAL LAW
When Griswold was litigated, there was no mistaking its criminal
posture. Newspaper accounts referred to the criminal prosecution and the
resulting fines that Griswold and Buxton paid as a result of their
convictions.116 The media also noted that the Connecticut statutes
110
At oral argument, the justices focused on the privacy argument and a latent equal protection
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2–3, 6–8, 10–12, 17, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (No. 496). There was no discussion of the criminal law reform debate. Id.
111
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which,
in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.” (emphasis added)).
112
Id. at 482.
113
Id. at 486.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 486.
116
See Free Speech Argued in Birth Clinic Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1961 (referring to Griswold
and Buxton as “defendants” and noting that the pair “ha[d] pleaded not guilty of charges of being an
accessory to the use of contraceptives”) (internal quotation marks omitted); New Haven Police Shut
Birth Clinic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1961 (noting that Griswold and Buxton were “arrested” and
“released in $100 cash bond”); Richard H. Parke, 2 Deny Violating Birth-Clinic Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 1961 (discussing Griswold and Buxton’s arrests and arraignments).
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presented classic criminal law issues regarding the likelihood of
enforcement.117 Likewise, the litigation materials referred to the litigants as
“defendants” and described the arraignment, trial, sanctions, and
subsequent appeals in detail.118 Yet, despite these acknowledgments of the
case’s criminal law provenance, we more often think of Griswold as a
constitutional law case,119 a reproductive rights case,120 or even as a family
law case.121 It is rarely characterized as a criminal law case.122
This is perhaps surprising. When Griswold was announced, many
scholars and advocates assumed that the decision would underwrite a
broader campaign to scale back the criminal regulation of sex and
sexuality, particularly laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy and
fornication.123 Indeed, in Griswold’s wake, there were a number of
challenges to state laws prohibiting sodomy and fornication. In Smayda v.
United States,124 two men charged with engaging in homosexual acts in a
public restroom relied on Griswold to challenge clandestine police
117
See Richard H. Parke, Birth Clinic Tests Connecticut Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1961 (quoting
Fowler V. Harper, a Yale Law professor and one of the attorneys in the Poe litigation, as saying “I
think citizens and doctors alike are entitled to know if they are violating the law” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
118
See Brief for Appellee at 1–2, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496)
(discussing, in the context of appellee’s jurisdictional statement, the issuing of warrants, as well as the
subsequent arrests and arraignments of Griswold and Buxton); Brief for Appellants at 2, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496) (discussing, in the context of appellants’ jurisdictional
statement, the arrests, arraignments, and criminal trial of Griswold and Buxton).
119
Griswold is a staple in Constitutional Law casebooks. E.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 331 (6th ed. 2014); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
970 (4th ed. 2013).
120
Griswold is often presented as a core part of the reproductive rights canon. E.g., MELISSA
MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE 536
(2014).
121
Griswold is often featured in family law casebooks. E.g., AREEN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 255 (6th ed. 2012); KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (4th ed. 2010).
122
None of the leading criminal law casebooks excerpts Griswold. E.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER &
STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed. 2012); SANFORD KADISH ET
AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2012); JOHN KAPLAN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2008). Notably, one casebook does discuss Griswold
in a footnote to Bowers v. Hardwick. See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 578 n.a (2005).
123
Indeed, in 1967, just two years after Griswold was announced, the ACLU issued a national
policy statement asserting that the criminalization of private, consensual sexual activities between
adults, constituted an impermissible infringement on the fundamental right to privacy. See JOHN
D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES 213 (1983). Litigators also took note of the
perceived vulnerability of sodomy statutes, relying on Griswold to challenge such laws in a number of
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969); Palmer v. Jones,
296 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ind. 1969); State v. Rheinhart, 424 P.2d 906 (Wash. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 832 (1967); People v. Hurd, 5 Cal. App. 3d 865 (1970).
124
352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965).
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surveillance practices. In this context, Griswold proved unavailing.
Although the Ninth Circuit was “as uncomfortable as the next man by the
thought that our own legitimate activities in such a place may be spied
upon by the police,” it nonetheless held that “the right of the public to
expect that the police will put a stop to its use as a resort for crime all join
to require a reasonable limitation upon the right of privacy involved.”125
Similarly, in Buchanan v. Batchelor,126 a litigant relied on Griswold to
challenge a Texas ban on sodomy. There, the Northern District of Texas
concluded that Griswold protected acts of sodomy between married
couples, but avoided the question of whether Griswold’s protections
extended to homosexual sodomy.127
Instead, Griswold fueled the expansion of reproductive rights and
autonomy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Griswold’s articulation of a right to
privacy was elaborated to permit unmarried persons access to
contraception.128 In 1973, Roe v. Wade concluded that the right of privacy
was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.”129
Griswold’s focus on marriage, the marital couple, and the home may
help explain why its logic never achieved much traction in the broader
debate over the criminal regulation of sex and sexuality, and why its roots
in the larger criminal law reform debate remain obscured today. Although
the majority acknowledged Griswold’s criminal character, it did not
directly confront or reference the underlying debate over criminal law
reform and liberalization. Instead, the Griswold majority devoted most of
its attention to tethering the newly articulated right to privacy to marriage
and the marital couple.130 As the right to privacy became inextricably
bound to marriage, it became unmoored from the broader conversation
about the criminal regulation of morals.
Griswold’s association with marriage and “a fundamental individual
right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child,” rather than a
broader notion of sexual liberty and restraint on state authority, was
evident in the Court’s discussion in Bowers v. Hardwick, a 1986 challenge
125

Id. at 257.
308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
127
Id. at 733 (concluding that traditional moral disapproval of sodomy was “not sufficient reason
for the State to encroach upon the liberty of married persons in their private conduct”); see also Cotner
v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1968) (concluding, in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding,
that a statute punishing acts of sodomy between married persons might well be unconstitutional after
Griswold); Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975) (refusing to extend
Griswold’s protections to same-sex sodomy).
128
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
129
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
130
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 497, 485–86 (1965) (explaining that marriage is “a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”
and is protected by “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”).
126
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131

to a Georgia sodomy prohibition. Although Michael Hardwick claimed
that Griswold and its progeny conferred a right to engage in private
consensual same-sex sodomy, the Bowers majority disagreed.132 As the
Court explained, there was “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
procreation . . . and homosexual activity.”133 Moreover, “any claim that
[Griswold and its progeny] nevertheless stand for the proposition that any
kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.”134
In this way, the Griswold decision, with its concern for the “sacred
precincts of [the] marital bedroom”135 transformed the case from one about
limits on state intervention in intimate life into one that was almost
exclusively about preventing state interference with marriage and
procreation. Indeed, it was this more limited framing that allowed
Griswold, and its articulation of a protected zone of privacy, to coexist
alongside Bowers’ repudiation of that zone for those deemed ineligible for
marriage and incompatible with procreation.
It would take almost forty years for the criminal law reform concerns
subordinated in Griswold to come to the fore in the Court’s jurisprudence
and its conception of the right to privacy. In 2003’s Lawrence v. Texas,136
the Court confronted a challenge to a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex
sodomy. The case, like Griswold before it, prompted arguments debating
the state’s use of the criminal law to police and enforce traditional sexual
mores.
In the briefs, the litigants and their amici proffered arguments that
directly referenced the MPC, the Hart-Devlin debates, and the years-earlier
debate over criminal law reform.137 Advocates for the state of Texas
emphasized the long-standing support for the state’s authority to regulate

131

478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
See id. at 189–90 (“We first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with
[Hardwick] that the Court’s prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of privacy that
extends to homosexual sodomy. . . .”).
133
Id. at 191.
134
Id.
135
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
136
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
137
See, e.g., Brief of the CATO Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152342, at *16 (“Popular support for the
consensual sodomy laws was also waning. Between 1969 and 1976, eighteen states decriminalized
consensual sodomy, consistent with the ALI’s Model Penal Code (“MPC”).”); Brief of Petitioners at 6,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152352, at *6 (“The Homosexual
Conduct Law was substituted for a facially nondiscriminatory law at a time when many States,
prompted by changing views about the proper limits of government power that were reflected in the
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, were revising their criminal codes and completely
abandoning offenses like fornication and sodomy.”).
132
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public morality. As they explained, morals offenses, like the challenged
sodomy ban, were rarely prosecuted.139 On this account, the law was not an
impermissible intrusion into intimate life; rather, it simply served to
express a societal consensus regarding normative sex and sexuality.140
Predictably, the petitioners and their amici underscored the right to
privacy as a limit on state interference in intimate life; however, in so
doing, they decoupled the right to privacy from Griswold’s emphasis on
marriage and the marital couple. According to the petitioners, “the
Constitution imposes substantive limits on the power of government to
compel, forbid, or regulate the intimate details of private sexual relations
between two consenting adults.”141 Privacy’s protections, they insisted, did
not begin and end at the altar: “Since Griswold, the Court has recognized
that all adults, regardless of marital status or other facets of their
relationship, have the same interest in making their own intimate choices
in” the area of sex and relationships.142
But even as the petitioners and their amici emphasized privacy as a
protection for private, consensual adult sex and sexuality, they also raised
other arguments that recalled the earlier criminal law reform debate. As an
initial matter, they noted that, as a result of the MPC and the broader law
reform debate, most laws legislating traditional sexual mores had been
repealed by judicial or legislative fiat.143 The persistence of sodomy bans
therefore reflected impermissible anti-gay animus, rather than an
appropriate exercise of state police power.144 Further, even if rarely
prosecuted, criminal sodomy laws raised concerns about discriminatory
enforcement, as well as concerns about the collateral civil consequences of
criminal convictions.145 Meaningfully, both of these issues—discriminatory
enforcement and collateral civil consequences—had surfaced years earlier
in the ALI debates over the MPC, as well as in the larger discussion of
criminal law reform.146
138
Respondent’s Brief at 42, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL
470184, at *42 (“The promotion of morality has long been recognized as a lawful function of
government.”).
139
Id. at *48 (maintaining that the application of sodomy statutes “is not common”).
140
Id. (“[T]he statutes . . . express a baseline standard expressing the core moral beliefs of the
people of the State.”).
141
Id.
142
Id. at *12.
143
Id. at *22 (canvassing these trends and noting that “bans on private sexual conduct between
consenting adults have been rejected in contemporary times”).
144
See id. at *4–6 (arguing that the challenged sodomy ban discriminated against gay men and
women by criminalizing “non-commercial, consensual, private sexual conduct” that would otherwise
be lawful if performed by “heterosexual adult couples, married or unmarried” ).
145
See, e.g., id. at *27–29 (describing the various civil consequences arising from criminal
convictions due to homosexual conduct).
146
See supra Part II (detailing the earlier effort to modernize and reform the criminal law and
limit the state’s ability to regulate intimate life).
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In invalidating the Texas anti-sodomy statute, the Lawrence majority
appeared to expand Griswold’s notion of marital privacy to include adult
relationships, whether married or not.147 But critically, in overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick,148 the 1986 decision upholding a similar sodomy
statute, the majority went beyond Griswold to explicitly delineate limits on
the state’s use of criminal law as a means of policing sex and enforcing
morals.149 In upholding Georgia’s criminal ban on sodomy, the Bowers
Court made clear that the state could use the criminal law for the
preservation and enforcement of majoritarian sexual mores. As the Bowers
Court explained, “[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality,
and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”150 By
contrast, in concluding that Bowers “should be and now is overruled,”151
the Lawrence majority framed the issue as “whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce [majoritarian sexual mores] on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law.”152
For the Lawrence majority, that issue seemed well-settled. According
to the majority, socio-legal developments over “the past half century”
reflected “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”153 As evidence of this “emerging awareness,” the
majority cited, among other developments, the MPC, which “made clear
that it did not recommend or provide for ‘criminal penalties for consensual
sexual relations conducted in private.’”154
As importantly, both the majority and concurring opinions in
Lawrence expressed concern for the collateral civil consequences of
criminal laws—even if those laws went unenforced. According to the
majority, “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
147
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. Lawrence’s effort to expand Griswoldian privacy to unmarried
couples built upon 1972’s Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute
that prohibited contraceptive use among unmarried persons. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438
(1972). Critically, the Eisenstadt Court decided the issue on Equal Protection grounds, concluding that
there was no rational justification for permitting contraceptive use among married couples, while
prohibiting the unmarried from doing so. Id. at 453–55. Referencing both Griswold and Eisenstadt,
Lawrence invalidated the anti-sodomy statute at issue on liberty grounds, concluding that the right to
privacy allowed unmarried adult couples the right to engage in private, consensual sex. Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 558, 562, 564–65, 578–79.
148
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
149
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
150
Id. at 196.
151
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
152
Id. at 571.
153
Id. at 571–72.
154
Id. at 572 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)).
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persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”155
In her concurrence to the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor elaborated
the point. Although sodomy prosecutions were rare, “[t]his case
shows . . . that [they] . . . do occur.”156 In addition to the stigma of being
labeled convicted criminals, those convicted under criminal sodomy bans
could encounter other long-standing impediments in their daily lives,
including restrictions “in the areas of employment, family issues, and
housing.”157
It was not just the majority and concurring opinions that framed
Lawrence as a case about limits on the state’s use of criminal law as a
mechanism for enforcing majoritarian sexual mores. In a stinging dissent,
Justice Scalia criticized the majority opinion on the ground that it licensed
the decriminalization of a wide range of extant sexual offenses, all of
which previously had been justified by the state’s authority to police and
enforce morals.158 In Lawrence’s wake, Justice Scalia predicted that
“[s]tate laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” would be
“called into question.”159 With its decision, Justice Scalia warned, “the
Court has taken sides in the culture war.”160 Although Justice Scalia
imagined this culture war to be confined to attitudes regarding
homosexuality,161 in truth, the culture war he imagined actually was part of
the larger debate about the state’s efforts to police morality and enforce
sexual conformity in intimate life. In other words, it was part of the very
same culture war that had raged since the 1950s.
In this way, Lawrence was the apotheosis of the criminal law reform
effort that anticipated (and helped produce) Griswold. Unlike Griswold,
which avoided directly engaging the question of legal reform of laws
regulating sex and sexuality more generally, Lawrence squarely confronted
this issue and determined that state criminal regulation of private,
consensual sex was inappropriate. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that
today, Lawrence is not known simply as a sexuality case, but also as a
155

Id. at 575.
Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
157
Id. at 582 (citing State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992)).
158
Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have
relied on the ancient proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual behavior is
‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis for regulation.”).
159
Id.
160
Id. at 602.
161
In an earlier case concerning the civil rights of LGBT people, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), Justice Scalia dissented, opining that the majority “ha[d] mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of
spite.” Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this account, in invalidating a Colorado referendum that
severely curtailed civil protections against sexual orientation discrimination, the majority, in Justice
Scalia’s view, had “mistaken” a genuine (and legitimate) struggle over the meaning and application of
public morals for base animus and rancor against LGBT persons. Id.
156
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criminal law case —one that endorses John Stuart Mill’s view that the
state may only limit the actions of individuals when doing so would
prevent harm to others.163 Under this logic, the preservation and
enforcement of public morals would no longer suffice as a justification for
the state’s use of the criminal law to police intimate life. As such,
Lawrence was not merely a decision that invalidated sodomy laws; it
constitutionalized a consensus about limits on state authority to regulate
intimate life that had first surfaced in the criminal law reform debate of the
1950s.
V. RECLAIMING HISTORY AND ENFORCING MORALITY
As the preceding Parts make clear, Griswold, Lawrence, and the line of
cases articulating a right to privacy are rooted in the debate over criminal
law reform that arose in the 1950s. Although the Court’s decision in
Lawrence explicitly drew upon these roots, Griswold’s relationship to this
debate and the issues it surfaced has been less studied and explored.
But there is much to be gained from reflecting on the criminal law
reform debate, and its connections to Griswold and the birth of a
constitutionally-protected right to privacy. Recovering Griswold’s criminal
law antecedents provides a more complete historical narrative for
understanding the case and assessing its impact on the development of the
right to privacy. A more accurate historical narrative not only makes clear
that Griswold is not exclusively about reproductive rights; it reminds us
that the interest in state control over reproduction was not—and does not
have to be—exclusively about the rights of privileged women. In this
regard, this history extends Griswold’s scope beyond reproductive rights to
include a larger discussion about the state’s authority to impose sexual
values and mores on all of its citizens.
As importantly, focusing on this aspect of Griswold’s history may also
help surface contemporary challenges to the rights and liberties of
citizens—challenges that have gone largely unnoticed. The criminal law
reform debate of the 1950s focused on the state’s use of the criminal law to
police morality because the criminal law was the primary means by which
162
Lawrence is featured in a number of leading criminal law casebooks. See, e.g., BONNIE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 2004) (excerpting Lawrence); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 121 (8th ed. 2007) (excerpting Lawrence); SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 281 (9th ed. 2012) (discussing Lawrence); CYNTHIA
LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 589 (1st ed. 2005) (excerpting
Lawrence); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE REGULATION
OF VICE 138 (2007) (excerpting Lawrence).
163
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) (“[T]he sole end for which mankind is warranted . . .
in interfering with the liberty action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others.”).
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the state marked and punished non-normative sex and sexuality. But even
as reformers focused on criminal law as the predominant engine of sexual
regulation, they made clear that their concerns were more generally
directed toward the exercise of state power in the lives of individual
citizens.164
Today, in the wake of Griswold, Lawrence, and the decriminalization
effort they reflect, criminal law does not pack the same punch as it did a
generation ago. But just because the criminal law regime of sexual
regulation has been (largely) dismantled does not mean that the state has
completely divested its interests in regulating sexual morality. Although it
has gone largely unremarked upon, for many years, a parallel civil regime
of sexual regulation existed alongside the criminal regime.165 And, as
Justice O’Connor observed in her concurrence in Lawrence, this system of
civil regulation frequently was exercised with reference to the extant (but
often unenforced) system of criminal regulation.166 For example,167 a police
officer could be fired from his job for having an extramarital affair.168
Under the police department’s administrative code of conduct, the
offending conduct would be charged under a provision prohibiting
“conduct unbecoming an officer.”169 Critically, however, these
administrative disciplinary charges were predicated on the fact that the
underlying conduct was not just “unbecoming,” but actually a criminal
act.170 As one court noted, “a[n administrative] rule prohibiting the
commission of [a] crime” was a sensible measure that a jurisdiction could
take to ensure that an officer did not engage in conduct that would
“diminish his respect in the eyes of the community, arouse cynicism,
discourage public cooperation, and perhaps encourage crime by others.”171
Today, in our post-Lawrence world, the regime of criminal sexual
regulation does not exist to provide a predicate for civil sexual

164
See supra text accompanying notes 20–43 (describing the reform movement’s interest in
limiting the state’s authority to intrude into the intimate lives of individuals).
165
See Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: Lawrence v. Texas and the Evolution of Sexual
Regulation, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing this parallel regime of civil sexual
regulation).
166
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Texas’ invocation
of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize
homosexual sodomy . . . . [T]he law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval . . . than as a
tool to stop criminal behavior.”); see also Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (“[C]ivil state
regulation of sex and sexuality often occurred in the shadow of extant criminal laws . . . these criminal
laws were never enforced . . . .”).
167
Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165.
168
See, e.g., Andrade v. City of Phx., 692 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1982).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 559.
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regulation. Instead, these civil means of regulating sex and enforcing
morality exist—and are exercised—independent of any criminal law
antecedent.173 And critically, these civil means of state regulation of sex
and sexuality may communicate moral disapprobation and compel
conformity with sexual norms as effectively as their criminal law
counterparts.174
Consider the facts of Anderson v. City of Lavergne.175 There, a police
officer began a romantic relationship with an administrative assistant in his
unit.176 A supervisor, professing an interest in avoiding sexual harassment
claims, ordered the couple to “‘cease all contact with each other’ outside of
the workplace.”177 When they refused, the officer was terminated for
failing to follow a superior’s order—a violation of the department’s code
of conduct.178 The officer filed suit challenging his termination, and at trial
he was awarded damages; however, on appeal, the court ruled in favor of
the City.179 Although the appellate court acknowledged constitutional
protections for association and privacy, and suggested that these
protections extended to “nonmarital romantic relationships,”180 it
determined that the supervisor’s order—and the policy prohibiting interoffice relationships that animated it—did not constitute a “direct and
substantial interference” with the officer’s “intimate associations.”181 The
officer “continued to enjoy the ability to form intimate associations with
anyone other than fellow police department employees of differing
rank.”182 Reviewing the order and policy under rational basis review, the
appellate court determined that the policy was rationally related to the
city’s professed interest in avoiding sexual harassment suits.183
Likewise, in Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City,184 a police department
reprimanded a female police officer for her off-duty sexual conduct. The
officer, who was separated from her husband, had engaged in extramarital
sex with an officer from a neighboring jurisdiction while attending an out172
See Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (noting that criminal law has receded as an
agent of sexual regulation, and in so doing, has eliminated the criminal predicate on which the parallel
system of civil regulation once depended).
173
See Murray, Rights and Regulation, supra note 165 (arguing that in the absence of criminal
law, civil modalities continue to intervene into intimate life to regulate sex and sexuality).
174
See id. (noting that, even after Lawrence, the state continues to use law to demand compliance
with majoritarian sexual norms and mores).
175
371 F.3d 879 (6th Cir. 2004).
176
Id. at 880.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 880–83.
180
Id. at 882.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
528 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2008).
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of-town training session. The officer challenged the department’s actions
on the ground that they violated her right to privacy.186 At trial and on
appeal, the officer lost.187 The Tenth Circuit interpreted Lawrence
narrowly, concluding that it did not confer a broadly defined fundamental
“right to private sexual activity.”188 According to the court, the
department’s sanction of private, consensual sex was a reasonable effort to
“further internal discipline [and] the public’s respect for its police officers
and the department they represent.”189
Together, Anderson and Seegmiller reveal the flaw in Griswold’s (and
Lawrence’s) progress narrative. As the facts of Griswold and Lawrence
make clear, the burdens of criminalization often are highly visible and
obviously recognizable190—an arrest, a criminal conviction, incarceration,
police surveillance, and, as the mid-century reformers noted, the
unwelcomed presence of the police officer under the bed.191 In this regard,
it is unsurprising that the initial efforts to draw limits on the state’s ability
to regulate sex and sexuality focused on these very visible forms of state
interference.
Griswold and its progeny are testament to the reform movement’s
success in limiting the state’s visible presence in intimate life. When we
assess the trajectory from Griswold to Lawrence, it is clear that the right to
privacy has become entrenched,192 and in so doing, has sequestered the
most intimate aspects of our quotidian lives from state intrusion.
But even as the right to privacy has become entrenched as a
constitutional norm, Griswold and its articulation of the right to privacy
was never closely associated with the broader effort to limit the state’s use
of the criminal law as a means of regulating intimate life. Instead,
Griswold, and the right it introduced, has come to represent a profound
shift in social and cultural values regarding sex.193
Prior to Griswold, sex was confined to marriage, and marriage was

185

Id. at 765.
Id. at 766.
187
Id. at 764.
188
Id. at 770–71.
189
Id. at 772.
190
George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 287
(1998) (describing the application of criminal law and the punishment that flows from it as “the most
elementary and obvious expression of the state’s sovereign power” over the individual).
191
See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
192
See Reva B. Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J. F. 316, 319–
21 (2015) (discussing the entrenchment of Griswold and the right to privacy).
193
Michael Compitello, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in the Battle
Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 159 (1997) (“There is no doubt that Griswold was part of
an overall sexual revolution that was occurring in America and that its effects in protecting the privacy
of the marriage relationship extended not just to the family in general, but far beyond.”).
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understood as a procreative, heterosexual institution. In rejecting this
vision (and increasing access to contraception), Griswold has been
understood as fueling the Sexual Revolution and a more permissive and
individualized sexual culture. On this account, Griswold is credited with
helping to transform society from one in which the state demanded
compliance with majoritarian sexual norms to one in which the state
respected some degree of sexual autonomy.195
Today, Griswold’s achievement is facilitating this profound change in
social values, rather than in limiting state authority. This perception of
Griswold, as much as the decision’s emphasis on marriage and the marital
couple, helps to explain why its role in the criminal law reform debate has
been obscured. In venerating Griswold’s role in transforming our culture,
we have overlooked its place in the effort to design limitations on the state.
Cases like Seegmiller and Anderson suggest the consequences of this
neglect. Because we have overlooked Griswold’s role in articulating limits
on the state’s regulatory authority, we have failed to think seriously about
all of the ways in which the state may curtail or impede the exercise of
individual autonomy in intimate life. Although Griswold and Lawrence
draw attention to the state’s use of criminal law to limit the exercise of
individual autonomy, cases like Seegmiller and Anderson suggest that state
interference in intimate life may take other forms.
In this regard, focusing on Griswold’s relationship to the criminal law
is important not because criminal law is categorically distinct from other
forms of state regulation, but because, as perhaps the most visible and
obvious form of state authority, criminal law draws our attention to the
state itself. In reminding us of the state’s thick role in shaping and
enforcing sexual norms, Griswold’s criminal law helps to illuminate and
contextualize the subtler, non-criminal forms of state sexual regulation that
have survived Griswold and Lawrence.

194
Murray, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 11, at 1265 (“Until the twentieth century, [procedural
rules and restrictions on entry into marriage] made clear that marriage was an intraracial, monogamous,
exogamous, and heterosexual union between consenting adults.”).
195
See Robert A. Sedler, Abortion, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Constitution: The View
From Without and Within, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 529, 531 (1998) (arguing that
the sexual revolution of the 1960s was “facilitated by the Supreme Court’s recognition of a so-called
constitutional ‘right of privacy’ in Griswold v. Connecticut”); George Weigel, The Sixties, Again and
Again, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 2008, at 22, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/03/004-the-sixtiesagain-and-again-36 (arguing that in Griswold, “the Supreme Court began to set in legal concrete the
notion that sexual morals and patterns of family life are matters of private choice or taste, not matters of
public concern in which the state has a legitimate interest”).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As we reflect on Griswold’s legacy, it is worth remembering that
Griswold was not solely about married couples’ access to birth control.
Instead, it was also part of a larger effort to think about the law’s place in
regulating intimate life. With this in mind, our approach to this storied
anniversary is perhaps more muted when we consider Griswold’s criminal
law antecedents and the decision’s underlying conservatism. By
recuperating the debate over criminal law reform, and Griswold’s place in
it, we also recover the fundamental question at the heart of that debate—
and at the heart Griswold: whether the state may use its authority to
censure and condemn private, consensual adult sex and sexuality?
When we focus on that question, it becomes clear that although much
has been achieved since Griswold, the effort to reform the relationship
between state regulation and individual liberty remains incomplete.
Although Griswold and Lawrence succeeded in flushing the police from
our bedrooms, the state remains a persistent presence in intimate life. In
this regard, recovering Griswold’s criminal law suggests how much
progress has been made, as well as the work left to do.

